NVIDIA Wasn't on Advantest's Customer List Last Year. Now It's 20% of Revenue.

The name that wasn't there

Advantest doesn't design chips. It builds the machines that test them — the tester a chip has to clear before it ships. Its FY2025 securities report discloses exactly which customers cross 10% of net sales, and the filing draws the before-and-after itself: last fiscal year, the two names on that list were Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., at ¥96.2 billion, and the Samsung group, at ¥87.7 billion. This fiscal year, the two names are the NVIDIA group, at ¥243.7 billion, and TSMC, at ¥124.9 billion. Samsung is gone. NVIDIA is now Advantest's largest disclosed customer, by a wide margin. A separate table in the same filing breaks the NVIDIA figure down further: the single entity NVIDIA International, Inc. alone accounts for ¥228.3 billion — 20.2% of net sales. A year ago, NVIDIA appeared on neither table at all.

Source: Advantest FY2025 securities report (84th period, filed ~2026-06), ‘Major Customers’ note and sales-by-counterparty table.

OpenAI's supplier list just reached ten

The fastest way to see how far the build-out has spread is to count who's willing to put a number on it. AMD's 10-K discloses a purchase agreement to deploy 6 gigawatts of AMD GPUs for OpenAI, with the first gigawatt running on Instinct MI450 chips. CoreWeave's 10-K names two separate dollar commitments from the same customer: up to $11.9 billion under a master services agreement running through October 2030, and a further $6.5 billion committed through May 2031. Add AMD to wafergraph's tracked OpenAI supplier list and the count reaches ten — NVIDIA, Broadcom, CoreWeave, Crusoe, Oracle, Nebius, Microsoft, TSMC, ASE, and now AMD — a documented supply base most decades-old industrials would recognize as their own.

Source: AMD FY2025 10-K (filed 2026-02-04); CoreWeave FY2025 10-K (filed 2026-03-02).

Even the power converters have a customer now

The dependency isn't confined to chips. Innoscience, a Chinese power-semiconductor maker, disclosed in its 2025 annual report that it has become NVIDIA's only Chinese chip supplier inside the 800-volt direct-current power architecture NVIDIA is standardizing for AI data centers. That's a sentence about voltage conversion, not GPUs — and it's an early look at where the next layer of chokepoints shows up. A rack pulling megawatts needs a power chain specified as tightly as the compute chain sitting on top of it.

Source: InnoScience 2025 Annual Report (HKEX filing, filed 2026-04-30).

The EUV monopoly, in three companies' own words

None of this is new in kind — it's an acceleration of a dependency structure the chain has run on for years, and this year's filings state it more plainly than usual. ASML's 20-F says Carl Zeiss SMT is its sole supplier of lenses, mirrors, illuminators and collectors, under what ASML itself calls an exclusive arrangement. Intel's 10-K says ASML is currently the sole supplier of EUV lithography tools it is deploying on Intel 4, Intel 3, and Intel 18A. TRUMPF's own annual report explains why it operates almost exclusively in the Netherlands: ‘this is where our customer ASML has its headquarters.’ Three companies, three separate filings, one closed loop — Zeiss can only sell EUV optics to ASML, ASML can only buy them from Zeiss, and no leading-edge fab on earth has an alternative to either. Lasertec, which makes the tools that inspect EUV masks for defects, shows the identical shape from the customer side: its own filing puts Intel at 33.3% of FY2025 revenue, TSMC at 26.3%, and Samsung at 19.9%. A monopoly's fortunes, in Lasertec's case, are three companies' capital budgets.

Source: ASML 20-F (filed 2026-02-25); Intel 10-K (filed 2026-01-23); TRUMPF Annual Report 2024/25; Lasertec FY2025 securities report (63rd period, filed 2025-09-25).

What the filings don't say, on purpose

Not every company in this dataset will hand over a customer list, and the honest version of this piece says so instead of papering over it. Arm, Applied Materials, Cadence, and Synopsys — four of the chain's largest names — all structurally anonymize customer concentration in their current filings, using generic labels like ‘Customer A’ or a flat statement that no single buyer clears 10% of revenue. Applied Materials' publicly listed customers are directionally plausible for a company its size, but nothing in its own 10-K — or in TSMC's, Intel's, Micron's, or four other companies' filings checked in reverse — names a single one of them. We didn't fill that gap with a guess. A dependency map built only from what companies choose to disclose isn't the real map, and saying so is the only way this one stays worth trusting.

Wafergraph's own edge-research audit, 2026-07-29 — full methodology at /methodology.

The shape underneath it

Line the filings up and a pattern falls out that no single 10-K shows on its own. A test-equipment maker's biggest customer changed in twelve months. A cloud provider's disclosed supplier list is now ten names deep. A Chinese power-chip maker is load-bearing for NVIDIA's own data-center architecture. A EUV lithography monopoly runs through three companies that can name each other in one sentence. None of that is visible from inside any single filing. It's only visible from reading all of them against the same graph — which is the whole reason to keep building one.

The filings

Every figure above, with the primary source it came from.

Click through to read any filing yourself — that's the point.